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Abstract
Energy security has emerged in recent years as one of the cor-
nerstones of the European Union’s (EU’s) foreign policy. The 
EU is highly dependent on imports of oil and gas, 35 per cent 
of which comes from Russia. Diversification of energy supplies 
is thus a key goal for the EU. The Caspian region contains 
some of the largest undeveloped oil and gas reserves in the 
world. The intense interest shown by the major international 
oil and gas companies testifies to its potential. Although the 
area is unlikely to become “another Middle East”, it could 
become a major oil supplier at the margin, much as the North 
Sea is today. As such it could help increase world energy secu-
rity by diversifying global sources of supply. Development of 
the region’s resources still faces considerable obstacles. This 
study focuses on the countries along the southern rim of the 
former Soviet Union that are endowed with significant oil and 
gas resources: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 
Central Asia, and Azerbaijan in Transcaucasia. The Southern 
Energy Corridor (SEC), which aims to link Caspian Basin and 
potentially Middle East gas supplies to Europe, is one of the 
EU’s six priority axes of energy infrastructures. Drawing on the 
external governance literature, this article provides an analy-
sis of the EU’s efforts in the wider Black Sea area to increase its 
energy security. It concludes that despite difficult domestic and 
geopolitical obstacles, the EU is pushing forward its objective 
to establish the SEC.
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1 Introduction
The dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 bore three ‘energy 
rich’ sovereign states in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. Their proven conventional natural gas reserves 
amount to 27.8tcm (trillion cubic metres), 13.3% of the world’s 
total. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
their total production will increase from 143 bcm (billion cubic 
metres) in 2009 to 265 bcm in 2035, and the region will become 
an important gas exporter (IEA, 2010). Table 1, presents the 
Central Asian states proven reserves, production, consump-
tion and net exports in detail. The Central Asian states seek to 
derive maximum benefit from their rich natural gas reserves. 
Inheriting the Soviet pipeline network, they have relied on 
Russia for the bulk of their west-bound gas exports (see Table 
2, for Central Asian exports by destination). The Russian dom-
inance on gas transit and the poor access to alternative markets 
have set value on Central Asian gas. In order to increase reve-
nues from their gas exports, the Central Asian states search for 
alternative pipeline projects which will diversify their transit 
routes as well as export markets. However, pipelines carrying 
Central Asian gas to distant markets have to pass through mul-
tiple countries which have their own strategic interests.
There are four major powers striving for potency in Central 
Asia: Europe and Turkey, led by the USA in the West, Russia 
in the North, rapidly growing China in the East and Iran seek-
ing to become a regional power in the South. Energy hungry 
emerging countries in Asia such as India, Pakistan and South 
Korea also could be added to the list as well. The Ukrainian 
gas crisis in 2009, has generated a great deal of commentary 
about European dependence on Russian energy in general and 
natural gas in particular. The price dispute which led to termi-
nation of Russian supplies to Ukraine in June 2014, and the 
possibility of interruptions of gas supplies to Europe, led to 
renewed calls for diversification of European gas supplies and 
reduction of Russian imports. The Caspian is of central interest 
for European energy security, although the supply chain from 
the region has been traditionally kept under Russian Federation 
control. However, for the past decade or so, the EU is becom-
ing increasingly ambitious in planning Caspian pipelines 
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that exclude Russian Federation’s territory and the Nabucco 
Pipeline project was in the centre of these strategic efforts for 
a considerable amount of time. The Caspian is therefore also 
at a crossroads between grand and conflicting energy interests 
of the Russian Federation and (Western) Europe. In addition to 
recouping the losses from energy trade important consequence 
will therefore be a much tougher competition to attract invest-
ments in the future, inevitably resulting in greater concessions 
made on the invested side which is likely to impact regional 
stability.
Table 1 Natural gas in Central Asia and Caspian Basin
Country
Production
Bcm
Consumtion
Bcm
Net
exports 
Bcm
Proven 
reserves
Bcm %
Azerbaijan 16 8.8. 6.6 1.1 0.6
Kazakhstan 11.1 7.8. 10.1 0.9 0.5
Turkmenistan 65.2 30.9 24.5 17.5 9.4
Uzbekistan 52.0 45.3 7.9 1.1 0.6
Total 144.7 92.8 42.5 20.6 11.1
Table 2 Natural gas exports from Central Asia and Caspian Basin
Exports to Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Russia - 10.9 2.8 3.3
Iran 0.24 - 7.2 -
China - - 27.7 1.5-
Turkey 5.3 - - -
Others 2.1 0.1 - 0.05
(British Petroleum), 2016 b. Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016 
Viewed 15 March 2017 ‹http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-
economics/statistical-review-2016/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-
2016-full-report.pdf›
By focusing on the EU’s goal of achieving greater diversi-
fication of energy supplies by importing gas from the Caspian 
Basin through the Southern Energy Corridor (SEC), the article 
argues that although there is an underlying tension between 
the geopolitical realities of the region, and the EU has been 
able to become a crucial player in the energy security of the 
region, pushing forward its agenda including the highly geo-
political Nabucco pipeline, the flagship of the SEC. Since 
the mid-2000s, the institutionalized approach of the EU has 
become a necessary condition for achieving EU goals at 
the regional level. Indeed, the article argues that the EU has 
become a ‘regional hub’, whereby it creates close cooperation 
at regional level through the attraction of its market. However, 
the EU-supported SEC builds upon the oil and gas pipelines 
supported by the USA in order to prevent Russian monopoly 
over the Caspian Basin supplies. If the SEC is possible then it is 
mainly because of the path-dependent processes set off by the 
east-west corridor, which inextricably linked the international 
position of Azerbaijan and especially Georgia and Turkey tran-
sit role between the Caspian Sea and Europe. Iran is the largest 
country in the Middle East with the capacity to pursue a seri-
ous international agenda. Iran is also located in a strategically 
significant area in the Middle East. It shares border with seven 
countries: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, 
Turkey and Turkmenistan.
Its long coastline on the southern edge includes the Persian 
Gulf waters and beyond the Straits of Hormoz, across from the 
Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Oman. This gives Tehran 
strategic control over the waterways through which the major-
ity of the world’s oil travels. Iran also sits on the Eastern edge 
of the Middle East region, closer than its neighbors to trade 
partners in Asia. Consequently, an amicable relationship with 
Tehran, who could be convinced to act in the common inter-
est of the region, would be highly beneficial for all parties 
involved (An EU Strategy for relations with Iran…, 2016). 
Iran has gone from being a consumer of foreign technology 
and a pure exporter of oil to being an exporter of oil, gas and 
petroleum products, a manufacturer of petroleum sector equip-
ment as well as a hub for energy connectivity in the region. 
Country has pipelines connecting with Turkmenistan and 
Turkey. With 80 million people, historical ties to the Central 
Asian countries, Iran could be counterweight to the Russia. 
EU’s demand of Caspian gas could be supply through Iran, it 
is the best and logical option.
This paper has two major aims: first to determine poten-
tial and importance in term of hydrocarbons of the countries 
which are shared Caspian basin. Second to examine the realis-
tic options for reducing European dependence on Russian gas. 
In so doing it examines the alternative gas options for reducing 
dependence on Russian gas; it also provides some idea of the 
possible supplies through the pipelines and the likely competi-
tiveness of Russian versus alternative gas supplies.
The analysis will be based on a mixture of documentary 
analysis and a review of previous literature. The documents 
are published by relevant actors, such as the US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy 
Agency (IEA). These documents provide necessary statistical 
information. This statistical data, in combination with previ-
ous literature on the different countries’ energy policies will 
be instrumental to gain a full understanding of the Caspian 
region’s energy security dynamics. The main data sources used 
are described briefly below. All energy data presented in this 
paper is based on the lower heating value. Energy Balances are 
used for general developments in energy demand and supply 
(i.e. 2013). For import dependence the European Commission 
– DG Energy 2016 Statistics Database is used. This database 
includes imports and exports to countries within the EU, by 
country of origin or destination.
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2 Profile of the Caspian Basin, the Caspian Water 
Plateau
The Caspian is the world’s largest enclosed or landlocked body 
of (salty) water – approximately of the size of Germany and 
the Netherlands combined. Geographical literature refers to 
this water plateau as the sea, or world’s largest lake that covers 
an area of 386,400 km² (a total length of 1,200 km from north 
to south, and a width ranging from a minimum of 196 km to a 
maximum of 435 km), with the mean depth of about 170 me-
ters (maximum southern depth is at 1025 m). At present, the 
Caspian water line is some 28 meters below sea level (median 
measure of the first decade of 21st century). The total Caspian 
coastline measures to nearly 7,000 km, being shared by five 
riparian (or littoral) states (Bajrektarevic, 2003).
The very legal status of this unique body of water is still not 
solved as to whether the Caspian is a sea or lake. As international 
law defers lakes from seas, the Caspian should be referred to 
as the water plateau or the Caspian basin. Interestingly enough, 
the Caspian is indeed both sea and lake: northern portions of 
the Caspian display characteristics of a freshwater lake, due 
to influx of the Volga river, the Ural River and other relatively 
smaller river systems from the northern Russian Federation.
The inner circle. The so-called “Inner Circle” of the Caspian 
Basin consists of the five littoral (riparian) states, such as 
Russian Federation, Islamic Republic of Iran, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, sharing the common coast-
line. They are of asymmetric constellation and could be 
roughly divided on the traditional two (Russian Federation and 
Iran), and the three newcomers (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan). This division also corresponds with the follow-
ing characteristic: only Iran and Russian Federation have open 
access to sea.
Table 3 Oil – Total proved reserves
Country
At end 1994 
Thousand million 
barrels
At end 2004 
Thousand 
million barrels
At end 2013 
Thousand 
million barrels
At end 2014 
Thousand 
Million Tones 
Thousand 
million 
barrels
Share of total R/P ratio
Azerbaijan 1.2 7.0 7.0 1.0 7.0 0.4% 22.6
Kazakhstan 5.3 9.0 30.0 3.9 30.0 1.8% 48.3
Turkmenistan 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.6 6.9
Uzbekistan 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.6 24.3
Central Asia total: 7.3 17.2 42.6 5.1 38.2 2.2% 102.1
BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2015 bp.com/statisticalreview
Table 4 Natural gas – Total proved reserves
Country
At end 1994 
Thousand 
million barrels
At end 2004 
Thousand 
million barrels
At end 2013 
Thousand 
million barrels
At end 2014 
Thousand 
million Tones
Thousand 
Million barrels
Share of 
total
R/P 
ratio
Azerbaijan n/a 0.9 0.9 41.2 1.2 0.6% 68.8
Kazakhstan n/a 1.3 1.5 53.2 1.5 0.8% 78.2
Turkmenistan n/a 2.3 17.5 617.3 17.5 9.3%
Uzbekistan n/a 1.2 1.1 38.3 1.1 0.6% 19.0
Central Asia total: 5.7 21 750 21.3 11.3% 166
BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2015 bp.com/statisticalreview.
Fig. 1 The Caspian Sea and its hydrogeology
Source: World Atlas (n.d.a.), n.p.a.; EVS, 2007, n.p.a
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2.1 Russian Federation
The Russian Federation controls the north- western shore of 
the Caspian Sea and only a negligible part of its extensive energy 
reserves appear to be located in the Caspian Basin. Therefore, 
Russian Federation has rather adopted a strategy of involve-
ment in the energy business of the other, better-endowed ripar-
ian states by means of joint resource development (production 
revenues) and granting access to the Russian Federation’s oil 
and gas pipeline system (transport revenues). The main players 
in this field are the state-owned companies Gazprom, Rosneft, 
and Transneft as well as numerous large private energy enter-
prises like Lukoil, Sibneft or Yukos (Crandall, 2006)
In light of the loss of economic influence in the Caspian after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, due to the overwhelming pre-
occupation with preserving the strategic influence in the region, 
following the sort of “Monroeski doctrine” (Kubicek, 2010).
The Russian Federation`s views dramatically shifted in the 
2000s from politico- security aspirations to also largely eco-
nomical. To this end, the Russian Federation turned to bilat-
eral and plurilateral agreements with Caspian littoral countries 
to secure its economic interests in the basin. With its unique 
policy, called “common waters, divided bottom”, it moved 
closer to the stances of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, following 
the principle of dividing the seabed into proportional national 
sectors (therefore, following the UNCLOS principle), while 
maintaining the common management of the surface water, 
preserving free navigation and common ecological standards 
for all littoral states (thus, partly following the lake principle 
by excluding the international community).
Due to these efforts Russian Federation agreed upon the divi-
sion of the Northern part of the Caspian with Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan, while still strongly affirming that the five-party 
consensus continues to be the only way to the final decision on 
the legal status of the Caspian (Zimnitskaya, 2010; Kapitonov 
et al., 2017: pp.44-52).
Although this agreement presents a good sign for the future, 
its major downside is that it is completely dependent on the 
good relations between littoral states and therefore dependant 
on the current geopolitical realities of the Caspian. Also, we 
must consider the defiance of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
the solution, since it diminishes its political and economic role 
in the basin, for it leaves the country with the smallest share 
and deepest waters.
With this division, the Russian Federation would receive 
18,5% of the Caspian seabed, while Kazakhstan would get 
29%, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan approximately 19% and 
Iran would be left with 14%.The top priority task in Russia’s 
fuel and energy expansion is to create an integrated water and 
fuel-energy complex in Central Asia (under Russian manage-
ment). One of the possible ways to carry out this task is to 
include Tajikistan in the water-energy consortium being cre-
ated. The Rogun Hydropower Plant-the most powerful in the 
region-is currently being built in this country. Gazprom will 
participate in reconstructing and building major gas pipelines, 
compressor stations, and other infrastructure facilities for 
Kyrgyzstan’s gas complex. It is very possible that Gazprom’s 
main activity in this undertaking will be transiting gas to other 
countries (China) (Laumulin, 2007). Russia’s goal is clear: it 
wants to strengthen its position as Turkmenistan’s main part-
ner in the energy sector and, in so doing, maintain control 
over the export of Turkmen gas. Ideally, Russia would like to 
control Turkmen gas in order to guarantee large-scale invest-
ments. Today, Turkmenistan is Russia’s private ward. Russian-
Turkmen relations are being built on Russia’s management of 
Turkmen gas assets through Gazprom. The most striking exam-
ple of Russia’s strategy is Gazprom’s actions in the region. 
This company is trying to establish control over the gas flows 
between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as between them 
and foreign markets. In so doing, it is more advantageous for 
Uzbekistan to sell gas previously intended for Kyrgyzstan to 
Fig. 2 The proposed and already effective division of the Caspian Basin. Source: EIA (2013a)
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Gazprom. Even though the details of the agreement signed with 
Kyrgyzstan are not being revealed, it is obvious that the inter-
ests of the Russian gas giant in this republic are not related 
to gas production. Transit of gas through Kyrgyzstan to other 
countries will become an important factor, since Kyrgyzstan 
directly borders on China.
Today, the growth rates of production, including those of gas 
export, from the Central Asian countries is much higher than 
the rates of modernizing and developing their gas transporta-
tion systems. But the main gas artery from the region’s states to 
Russia-the major gas Central Asia-Center pipeline – is currently 
operating to its limit. This relates to all three gas transportation 
countries: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Regarding intra-regional relations in general, Russian 
Federation concerns about the influence of the EU and the US 
in the Caspian Basin have increased in the recent past due to 
the eagerness to regain its role as a major power. As for Iran, 
the historically adverse relations have improved in some areas 
as the two powers still share a number of mutual interests in the 
Caspian Basin, for instance the opposition to growing Western 
interference in regional affairs or the proposed construction of 
a trans-Caspian (Dekmejian, 2003).
2.2 Islamic Republic of Iran
Iran has long had the ambition of becoming a major gas 
exporter, including to Europe. After many years of misman-
agement and underperformance by the previous administration, 
the Rouhani government has shown a desire for the country to 
become a major regional and international gas player. Despite 
ranking among the world’s leading oil producers and the second 
largest producer of natural gas, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 
share of the local oil and gas reserves is negligible, just as in the 
case of Russian Federation. Iran holds 16% of global proven 
gas reserves BP (Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009). 
Total gas production in 2014 was 172.6bcm, while domestic 
consumption stood at 117.6 bcm (Statistical Review of World 
Energy, 2009). Increased to 131.2 bcm in 2009, consumption 
did as well (131.7 bcm). More than a third of domestic con-
sumption is used for boosting oil production by pumping gas 
into maturing oil fields. The share of natural gas with Iranian 
TPES has increased strongly in the past 10 years. In 2000, the 
usage of gas for the first time exceeded that of oil. In 2009, 
natural gas had a share of 57.9% of total energy supplies, oil 
was down at 40.8%. Foreign investment is all blocked due to 
US bilateral sanctions based on the Iran sanctions Act (1996), 
sanctions imposed by the UN and the EU (Mangott, 2010: 
pp.45-46). It is in Russia’s vital interest that Iran does not turn 
into a competitor on the EU gas markets. EU and US compa-
nies’ refusal to trade gas with Iran due to its presumed nuclear 
weapons program actually serves Gazprom’s interest. Russia is 
keenly interested to direct Iran’s future gas exports to consum-
ers in the East-countries such as Pakistan, India or China. It is 
strategic interest which (partly) explains Gazprom’s interest to 
develop Iranian gas fields-most notably South Pars-and finance 
Iran’s ambitious export pipeline Iran-Pakistan-India.
Iran is considered an attractive export route for oil and gas 
between Central Asia and Europe, and for oil from both Central 
Asia and Transcaucasia to the Persian Gulf. It already has a 
well developed oil and gas infrastructure, including portions 
of pipeline that could be used for the routes mentioned above 
or for swaps. By some estimates, an Iranian route could prove 
significantly cheaper than other proposed pipelines. Iran is also 
seen as an alternative to transport via Russia. As a Caspian lit-
toral state, Iran will also play an important role in the devel-
opment of oil and gas resources in parts of the Caspian Sea. 
All Caspian littoral countries will have to co-operate closely on 
a number of issues, in particular the protection of the marine 
environment of the Caspian Sea. Iran, which shares borders 
with both Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, is a neighbor with 
whom the Central Asian and Transcaucasian states are keen 
to maintain good relations. As an important trading route and 
partner, Iran already exerts considerable economic and politi-
cal influence. Its ability to do so could increase significantly if 
it were to become a major transit route for Central Asian and 
Transcaucasian energy exports.
Foreign policy priorities have been affected by its past 
dominance as well as the religious ties with the Republics of 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. However, these 
newly independent states (NIS) see Islamic Republic of Iran´s 
potential in cheap transit routes for oil and gas. Of the most con-
cern are the Islamic Republic of Iran´ s relations with Azerbaijan, 
hampered due to Azerbaijan´s westward cooperation on energy 
matters (Dekmejian, 2003) and the contradicting positions on 
defining the legal status of the Caspian. Additionally, the eth-
nic Azeri minority makes up nearly a quarter of Iran´s popu-
lation. An economically strong and independent Azerbaijan, 
gaining acknowledgement on the international political stage, 
could potentially incite the Azeri population in Iran to start its 
own nationalistic movement and threaten its territorial integrity. 
To prevent Azerbaijan to rise any further as a global oil player 
might as well be seen as Iran’s strategic goal (Croissant, 1999). 
Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic of Iran does not generally 
promote discrimination of the Azeri minority, because their 
intellectual and economic elite is very well integrated in the 
Iranian society. A prime example for this is that the father of 
Ajatolla Khameini is an Azeri (Pivariu, 2014).
There are serious doubts about the viability of the proposed 
Armenia–Georgia–Ukraine pipeline on economic and – follow-
ing Russia’s annexation of Crimea – geographical grounds.100 
Aside from these options, gas exports to Europe via Turkey 
using existing infrastructure, seems the most feasible option 
prior to 2020. 
Irrespective of the technical and geopolitical feasibility of 
these proposed routes, the second major uncertainty over the 
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export of Iranian gas to Europe is the availability of sufficient 
gas for export markets over and above Iran’s domestic require-
ments. Iran’s growing domestic consumption (due to population 
growth, market expansion, and gas for oil substitution policies, 
oilfield gas reinjection requirements, and the development of 
added-value industries) has severely impacted the country’s 
ability to produce sufficient gas for export markets. With the 
required investment and technology, Iran could increase produc-
tion capacity to around 210–230 bcm/year by 2018, but this is 
expected to be mainly allocated to domestic and regional export 
markets. After meeting growing domestic demand – expected to 
reach 200–220 bcm/year before 2020 – and supplying gas to the 
already contracted export markets of the neighboring countries 
of Turkey (10 bcm/year), Iraq (10 bcm/year), and Oman (5–10 
bcm/year), any gas available for export to the rest of Europe is 
expected to remain marginal prior to 2020.
Beyond 2020, depending on how fast Iran can develop the 
remaining phases of the South Pars and other major discov-
ered gas fields, the country’s total production capacity could 
reach around 350 bcm/year by 2030 (Hassanzadeh, 2014). It is 
only then that significant exports to Europe can be envisaged, 
provided that the required infrastructure can be made avail-
able. Any direct gas export to Europe requires extensive infra-
structure, very significant sources of funding, and long-term 
agreements which would take Iran and its potential European 
partners at least 10 year to develop (from Heads of Agreement 
to first export volumes). The time scale will probably be even 
longer for LNG exports, due to the complex technical and com-
mercial nature of such projects. Exports of around 10–20 bcm/
year to Europe through Turkey via the existing infrastructure 
are possible in the 2020s, but it is unrealistic to imagine more 
substantial volumes becoming a reality until after 2030. This 
conclusion pre-supposes that the political forces within Iran 
which oppose exports do not prevail, given that reinjection 
of gas into oilfields (for secondary and tertiary recovery) and 
additional investment in petrochemicals can be argued to pro-
vide a higher return for the country than gas exports.
2.3 Azerbaijan
As a state on the shore of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan is 
endowed with rich oil and gas resources and is currently expe-
riencing an oil boom. Azerbaijan’s total energy production has 
increased almost three-fold from 27.9 million to 74.9 million 
oil equivalent mainly due to oil and gas production. The coun-
try’s total energy consumption in 2009 was about 15.7 million 
tons, which means that a significant part of its production is 
exported (Ciarreta, 2012:pp.282–292). 
Controlling the western side of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan 
holds a crucial position between Central Asia and Europe. Thus, 
by reconstruction of the economy, development and integration 
with globalized world, Azerbaijan, as one of the most import-
ant pillar has reached transmission lines allowing the export of 
energy sources. The most oil production was in 1941, which 
were 23.4 million tones till 2005 from the first date of produc-
tion of oil. After the independence, reconstructing and enter-
ing the modification period reduced the oil production. But 
new steps and activities according to the “Agreement of The 
Century” increased the oil production. By the commencement 
of first oil production of Chiraq deposit in November 1997,the 
petrol production increased in 1998. Oil production was 15.3 
million tons in 2003, 15.5 million tons in 2004, 22.2 million 
tons in 2005 and 32.3 million tons in 2006. With the amount 
of oil production in 2006 Azerbaijan put behind the oil produc-
tion record of 1941 which was 23.4 million tons. The amount 
of oil production was 41.7million tons in 2007.Heavily depen-
dent on the oil sector, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan 
Republic (SOCAR) was created to efficiently benefit from the 
abundance of hydrocarbon resources in the respective sector of 
the Caspian Sea (Aras, 2013:pp.79-81). 
The Shah Deniz Phase 2 project is expected to go into produc-
tion in late 2018, and to start exporting to Europe in late 2019. 
Of the 16 bcm/year of output, 6 bcm will be sold to Turkey and 
10 bcm to Europe (including 1 bcm each to trading companies 
in Greece and Bulgaria, and 8 bcm to Italy and adjacent hub 
markets) (Shah Deniz major sales agreements…, 2013).
In addition to Shah Deniz, there are several offshore 
Caspian fields and exploration prospects that could increase 
Azerbaijan’s gas production in the 2020s. One field, Absheron, 
has been declared commercial (but is yet to achieve FID) under 
a PSA (with Total as operator, GDF Suez, and SOCAR); pro-
duction is expected to start in 2021, with 3–5 bcm/year in the 
initial phase. Beyond that there are other fields and exploration 
prospects that could be developed under PSAs or joint ven-
tures, subject to exploration success and/or appraisal drilling. 
SOCAR officials have projected an increase in production to 
40–45 bcm of sales gas by 2025; (Scalability as Drawn, 2012) 
this assumes 9–14 bcm/year of gas from the new offshore proj-
ects by that date and must therefore be regarded as a maximum 
level. It seems likely that there would be a call on some of 
this gas from Azerbaijan’s domestic market, and from Georgia. 
We estimate that 3–8 bcm/year of additional gas could become 
available for export to Europe at some point in the 2020s.
2.4 Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
Holding the greatest share of Caspian oil in its national 
sector, Kazakhstan´s foreign policy is influenced by its depen-
dence on Russian Federation as a primary energy transit route. 
Additionally, the growing inflow of FDI from China signals the 
rising importance of cooperation with the east. Due to these 
vast energy resources in possession, Kazakhstan`s decision on 
energy export routes is highly important for the (in) stability of 
the current power game in the Caspian. 
Uzbekistan is a major gas producer (50–60 bcm/year 
in recent years), and Kazakhstan an expanding one (about 
133Energy Export Potential in the Caspian Region ... 2017 25 2
12 bcm/year in recent years, likely to rise to 20–25 bcm/year in 
the 2020s). Most Uzbek and Kazakh gas is consumed domesti-
cally; small quantities (7–10 bcm/year from each) are exported 
to Russia; and both countries have concluded framework agree-
ments, and some contracts, with China, providing for exports 
via the Turkmenistan–China pipeline, which started in 2013 
from Uzbekistan. It is possible that Uzbek and Kazakh exports 
to Russia will fall in the 2020s, but there will be calls on this 
gas from China and from their domestic markets (Reducing 
European Dependence on Russian Gas…, 2014).
There are hypothetically three ways that Uzbek and Kazakh 
gas could reach the European market: 
- Kazakh gas could be transported by pipeline across the 
Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and thence to Europe. But the 
volumes available are negligible (assuming that exports 
to China remain minimal, and exports to Russia cease, 
perhaps 10 bcm/year at some point in the 2020s), and the 
trans-Caspian crossing would be longer than in the case 
of Turkmenistan. Such a prospect may therefore be disre-
garded, at least until a Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan pipeline 
has been completed. 
- Kazakh gas could be transported through Russia to 
Azerbaijan and thence to Europe. The costs involved, and 
the fact that Russia would be required to transport the 
gas, mean that this prospect can be disregarded for the 
purposes of this paper. 
- Kazakh and/or Uzbek gas could be transported via 
Russia, via existing pipelines, to European destinations. 
(Such sales were conducted, with the gas bought and 
resold by Gazprom and other Russian companies, from 
the mid 1990s to 2009.) (Pirani, 2012). 
2.5 Turkmenistan
The European Southern Corridor strategy, Turkmenistan 
has been as a key piece. Turkmen gas could come from Trans-
Caspian pipeline, envisioned to transfer Turkmeni gas to 
Azerbaijan via the Caspian sea, where it could easily connect 
to the pipelines heading for Europe. These plans also effec-
tively bypass both Russian Federation and Islamic Republic of 
Iran, but their major downfalls are the bad relations between 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over the demarcation of the 
Caspian basin. East-West pipeline, envisioned to connect 
south-eastern Turkmeni gas fields with the Caspian (also creat-
ing a gate-way for Turkmenistan to European markets).
For Iran, a closer relationship with Turkmenistan prom-
ised useful oil swap agreements and access to the potentially 
lucrative Turkish natural gas market. The related further step 
of reaching Europe through Turkey would have put both Iran 
and Turkmenistan on the map as competitors to Gazprom. Iran 
considered, therefore, the 6 BCM Korpedzhe (on the Caspian 
shore of Turkmenistan) to Kurt-Kui line as a useful first step. 
The line was funded by Iran, with Turkmen debt to be repaid 
through gas deliveries. Still, the line had immediate advantages 
for Iran. A new domestic line linking gas fields in the south 
to the populous and industrial north-west would have cost far 
more than the Korpedzhe to Kurt-Kui pipeline (Kandiyoti, 
2008:pp.75-93). 
Since then Beijing has emerged as Turkmenistan near 
monopolistic buyer-about 80 percent of Turkmen gas exports 
are now directed toward China. If the Turkmen authorities want 
to avoid total dependency on China, they will have to reopen 
discussion with Europe, but such a push does not appear likely 
to come either from Ashgabat or from Brussels in short term 
(Lazrelle and Mankoff, 2016). 
I assume that the only likely Central Asian source for sig-
nificant gas exports to Europe is Turkmenistan. With only 
Turkmenistan contributing significantly to any gas transport 
towards the EU, additional gas from Azerbaijan will most likely 
have to measure the necessary capacity utilization and econo-
mies of scale in order to make the EU’s tapping of Caspian 
resources economically viable.
2.6 Other external actors
Other players from the international community have been 
able to enter the Caspian game rather successfully following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The three former Soviet Republics 
were in desperate need of technology and capital to exploit the 
hidden Caspian resources; the outside involvement was therefore 
seen as crucial for developing drilling and exporting capabilities 
and also distancing Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan 
from the Russian Federation. The Caspian basin being land-
locked is dependent upon pipelines and shipping through neigh-
boring states to reach consumer markets. Upgrading old Soviet 
pipelines and constructing others became pivotal for the eco-
nomic stability of the region and it also gave way to major strate-
gic planning of these new pipeline routes. The three post-Soviet 
Caspian littoral states were not very powerful in regional, let 
alone global, terms. Newly independent, with weak militaries, 
barely functioning economies, and great prospects for domestic 
and external conflict, they were easy targets for other interested 
parties looking to exploit these circumstances 
With regards to the transshipment of hydrocarbon to the inter-
national market, the importance of the interests and the state of 
political environment in countries such as Georgia, Armenia, 
Turkey, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, com-
monly referred to as the Outer Circle, needs to be remembered.
At the beginning of the energy hype around the Caspian, 
Turkey felt they can exploit their culture (considering that the 
Azeris, Turkmen, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks are all Turkic peoples) 
and its status as a modern, successful state to gain major influ-
ence in the region. Unfortunately, this perception proved to be 
by far a too optimistic one; although Turkish construction firms 
seem to do well in securing businesses in the region, when it 
comes to investment and major energy projects, all Caspian 
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Table 5 Import Dependency-All Fuels (%)
Import from extra EU 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 2014
EU -28 43.1 46.7 52.2 52.6 53.1 53.5
Index 1995 100.0 108.3 121.1 122.2 123.3 124.1
Intra and Extra-EU imports
BE 80.8 78.1 80.1 77.9 77.4 80.1
BG 55.9 46.0 46.7 39.6 37.7 34.5
CZ 20.6 22.9 28.0 25.6 27.9 30.4
DK 33.4 -35.0 -49.8 -15.7 13.3 12.8
DE 56.8 59.4 60.4 60.1 62.66 61.6
EE 32.3 32.2 26.1 13.6 11.9 8.9
IE 69.5 84.8 89.6 86.6 89.3 85.3
EL 66.7 69.5 68.6 69.2 62.2 66.2
ES 71.7 76.6 81.4 76.7 70.4 72.9
FR 48.0 51.5 51.6 49.1 48.0 46.1
HR 36.1 48.4 52.5 46.6 47.0 43.8
IT 81.9 86.5 83.4 82.6 76.8 75.9
CY 100.5 98.6 100.7 100.8 96.4 93.4
LV 70.4 61.0 63.9 45.5 55.8 40.6
LT 63.1 59.4 56.8 81.8 78.3 77.9
LU 97.7 99.6 97.4 97.1 97.0 96.6
HU 47.9 55.2 63.1 58.2 52.1 61.7
MT 104.8 100.3 100.1 99.0 104.1 97.7
NL 20.0 38.1 38.0 30.3 26.1 33.8
AT 66.4 65.4 71.6 62.8 61.6 65.9
PL -1.2 9.9 17.2 31.3 25.6 28.6
PT 85.3 85.1 88.6 75.1 72.9 71.6
RO 30.3 21.8 27.6 21.9 18.5 17.0
SI 50.9 52.8 52.5 48.6 46.9 44.6
SK 68.5 65.6 65.3 63.1 59.2 60.9
FI 53.6 55.1 54.2 47.8 48.5 48.8
SE 38.9 40.7 36.8 36.6 31.6 32.1
UK -16.4 -16.9 13.4 28.4 46.4 45.5
EU energy in figures, statistical pocketbook 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/statistics/energy-statistical-pocketbook.
states seem to prefer the Russian Federation, American or 
European investors. An important aspect for Turks is the BTC 
pipeline, which connects Turkey directly to the Caspian region, 
although most of the country`s energy needs are still met through 
pipelines coming from the Russian Federation, most notably the 
Blue Stream. But, as it always is with the unpredictable strate-
gic gaming in the Caspian, with the suspension of the Nabucco 
(Nabucco- West) and recently, the South Stream Project, it has 
become evident that Turkey could play a much more crucial role 
in the future of pipeline diplomacy. For now, both the EU and 
Russian Federation are entertaining themselves with a dream of 
a gas route through Turkey: EU sans Russian Federation, with 
a starting point in Azerbaijan and Russian Federation with a 
stream of gas flowing from Russian Federation fields, through 
Greece and Turkey. We have yet to witness which Southern 
Corridor strategy will be implemented. What is clear, though is 
that Turkey gained greatly in her starting position because of the 
zero-sum gaming process between Russian Federation and the 
EU, so her expectations of being an important (pivotal) transit 
country can become a reality in the near future.
3 The EU’S Energy Import Dependency
In 2011, the EU-27 imported about 83 per cent of its crude 
oil, 64 per cent of natural gas and 47 per cent of its coal 
demand. European Commission 2011 (Directorate general for 
energy, key figures, 2015).
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Fossil fuel projections towards 2030 indicate that gas demand 
is most likely to rise while oil consumption will stagnate at the 
current high level (Europe’s energy position, 2008). So far, 
Russia is the EU’s most important energy supplier. Russia’s 
share of EU gas.oil, and coal imports amount 34 per cent, 33 per 
cent and 26.2 per cent respectively. For the sake of comparison, 
Norway and Libya, the EU’s second and third largest supplier of 
oil, account for about 15 and 10 per cent of imports. In the field 
of gas, Norway and Algeria contribute 31 and 14 per cent to 
the EU’s demand (Gstol, 2015). Though EU energy imports are 
likely to further diversify as a consequence of increasing lique-
fied natural gas imports from Africa and Middle east, additional 
political steps towards diversification are necessary.
An important conclusion from Table 6 is that for the three 
groups of countries which are highly dependent on Russian gas, 
demand is expected to increase by less than 7 bcm during the 
period 2013–2030: in Central Europe by 5.2 bcm, in the Baltic 
countries by 1.05 bcm, and in south-east Europe by 0.4 bcm. 
In 2030, total demand for gas in countries highly dependent on 
Russian gas in the Baltics and south-east Europe will be 19.3 
bcm. In Central Europe, demand is much larger, particularly 
in Poland (which has significant domestic gas production and 
an SCI which is significantly lower than other countries in the 
region). Table 6 sets Turkey apart, as its gas demand is of a 
completely different order of magnitude and in the 2020s will 
approach the sum of all other countries. This data provides use-
ful metrics for considering how much gas would be needed to 
replace Russian gas in the most dependent European countries 
up to 2030. 
4 Alternative Sources of Gas Supply to Europe
In the early 1970s, European indigenous production covered 
most of the region’s gas demand. By 2013, due to faster growth 
rates of consumption and a decline in gas production since the 
early 2000s, it only accounted for around 57 per cent of demand 
(IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics, 2014).), European 
production is falling everywhere apart from Norway, and as 
a result, despite slow demand growth expected up to 2030, 
Europe will become increasingly dependent on imports. Two 
countries represented 70 per cent of the indigenous production 
in 2013 – Norway: 109 bcm and the Netherlands: 86 bcm. These 
countries are also the two main sources of indigenous gas for the 
Table 6 Gas demand scenarios for those countries which are – and are likely to continue to be – highly dependent on 
Russian gas (with an SCI exceeding 30) up to 2030.
Gas demand in 
2013
Russian gas 
imports in 2013
Gas demand projections
2015 2020 2025 2030
Central European countries
Austria 8.53 4.79 8.53 7.54 7.60 7.11
Czech Republic 8.47 7.27 8.08 8.69 8.68 9.94
Slovakia 5.81 5.06 4.72 4.86 6.19 7.66
Poland 18.31 11.87 15.73 17.08 19.49 21.07
Hungary 9.28 5.52 10.65 11.12 10.37 9.79
Total 50.4 34.51 47.70 49.30 52.33 55.57
Baltic countries
Estonia 0.68 0.64 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.43
Latvia 1.73 1.01 1.83 1.93 2.05 2.13
Lithuania 2.71 2.21 3.24 3.47 3.75 4.03
Finland 3.48 3.22 2.33 2.35 2.72 3.06
Total 8.6 7.08 7.74 8.13 8.92 9.65
South east European countries
FYROM 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Bosnia/Herzegovina 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.30
Bulgaria 2.59 2.67 2.89 3.03 3.14 3.29
Serbia 2.52 1.84 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30
Greece 3.84 2.39 4.32 4.10 3.85 3.64
Total 9.3 7.17 9.89 9.82 9.69 9.65
Grand Total 68.3 48.76 65.33 67.25 70.95 74.86
*converted to European units by reducing data in Table 1 by 7.97% 
Sources: 2013 demand for OECD countries from IEA Natural Gas (2014), Tables 3 and 8, pp. 8–9, 16–17; 
Russian imports from Table 1; 2015–2030 projections from Honoré (2014).
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other European countries. Production from the UK continental 
shelf (UKCS) is still significant, at about 38 bcm, but it only 
represents about half of the national needs. Another 19 countries 
produced gas in 2013; this was used by their national markets, 
except for Denmark which exported small quantities. Table 7 
shows scenarios for indigenous gas production in Europe for 
2015, 2020, and 2030. Production is expected to decline from 
282 bcm in 2013 to about 266 bcm in 2015, mostly due to the 
limit imposed on production from the Groningen field in the 
Netherlands. By 2020, indigenous production could decline by 
another 20 bcm as a result of sharper decline in the Netherlands, 
UK, and Germany. By 2030, European conventional gas pro-
duction is expected to be about 172 bcm, a reduction of 110 bcm 
compared with 2013 (Reducing European Dependence on 
Russian Gas…, 2014:p.12).
Table 7 also shows that the total is very dependent on the 
three largest producers, which account for 82–84 per cent of the 
total throughout the period.
Table 7 Indigenous conventional gas production in 
European markets 2013–2030 (bcm)
Country 2013 2015 2020 2030
Norway 109 109 110 100
UK 38 38 34 20
Netherlands 86 71 63 26
Other 49 48 39 27
TOTAL 282 266 246 172
Norway/
UK/
Netherlands
as a % of total
83 82 84 84
Sources: Danish Energy Agency (2014). Oil and gas production in 
Denmark and Subsoil Use, Annual report, p.19
www.ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/dokumenter/publikationer/
downloads/danmarks_olie-_og_gasproduktion_2013_uk.pdf
5 The EU’S South European Gas Corridor: Options 
for Guaranteed Long-Term Gas Supplies
The EU has been more active outside its borders in attempt-
ing to diversify its import supply routes and strengthen its ties 
with non-Russian suppliers in its neighborhood. This had led 
to a nascent ‘energy diplomacy’. Already in 2008 the EU had 
launched a strategy to open up new gas import routes from 
Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East – a project 
known as the Southern Corridor.
In June 2013, the Shah Deniz consortium and its leading 
stakeholders (the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), 
BP, Statoil, Total, Lukoil, NICO and TPAO, Turkey’s national 
energy company) concluded negotiations that have lasted over 
a decade, approving the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) for the 
final leg of a pipeline bringing gas from the Shah Deniz field 
in the Caspian Sea to European markets. The consortium made 
a Final Investment Decision (FID) for stage 2 development 
of the Shah Deniz field, triggering plans to expand the South 
Caucasus Pipeline through Azerbaijan and Georgia, construct 
the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey and 
construct the TAP across Greece and Albania and into Italy. The 
first gas delivery to Europe (10 bcm/y) is scheduled for 2019 
while plans to double this capacity are on the books. Another 6 
bcm/y will go to Turkey [33]. The development of the pipeline 
will mark a success for a long-mooted project that has been 
plagued with worries over long-term profitability in supplying 
Europe with additional gas. In order to diversify EU gas sup-
ply, and to provide Caspian suppliers with new export routes, 
several projects have been studied, re-evaluated, scrapped and 
resurfaced for the Southern Gas Corridor. Initial plans foresaw 
the construction of a 31 bcm pipeline called Nabucco from 
Baku to the Bulgarian border and then to Baumgarten, Austria, 
but the Shah Deniz consortium’s 2013 decisions will connect 
Baku to Greece via TAP and TANAP (20% owned by Turkish 
BOTAS and TPAO and 80% by SOCAR). The European 
Commission’s declared objective remains to eventually supply 
10% of European gas demand via an enhanced Southern Gas 
Corridor (Implementation of the Communication…, 2013), 
but the current scenario would see the Corridor initially sup-
ply about 2% of Europe’s demand. This may seem minor, but 
the countries receiving the gas – from Bulgaria to Greece – 
are those that have the biggest energy security concerns due 
to reliance on Russian gas. The pipeline is also expected to 
instigate further infrastructure connections throughout the 
Balkans. The Commission has invested major efforts over the 
last decade in supporting first Nabucco, and now TAP/TANAP, 
granting the project exemption from third-party access reg-
ulation. Project costs have been estimated at €3.9 billion for 
TAP (Mombelli, 2013) €9 billion for TANAP, and almost €30 
billion for the entire project, including further development 
of the Shah Deniz field (Guy, Ch., 2013). With British petrol 
committing its Shah Deniz resources to the EU’s Southern Gas 
Corridor 10 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas will even-
tually find its way to Europe by 2018 (Turkmen gas…, 2012).
The source diversification provided by the Southern Gas 
Corridor is not a panacea for European energy security but rep-
resents an important step in expanding Europe’s energy fron-
tiers towards the Caucasus and potential future partners in Iraq, 
Turkmenistan or Azerbaijan. 
The Caspian and the Central Asian countries have a number 
of options to diversify their transport routes as well as export 
markets. While there is only the Turkmenistan–China pipeline 
to reach eastwards, three routes extend from Central Asia to the 
West: via the Caspian Sea, via Iran, and via Russia.
Nabucco-West vs.TAP: After years of fierce competi-
tion among Europe’s energy giants, the developers of a major 
Azerbaijani natural gas field in the Caspian Sea recently picked 
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the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) project over the Nabucco 
West project to transport Caspian natural gas to Europe. 
According to the estimated cost of the project is around $5 bil-
lion (TAP clinches Azeri, 2014). If constructed, TAP, developed 
by Norway’s Statoil, Switzerland’s EGL and Germany’s E.ON, 
will ship 10 bcm of gas per year, with the option to increase the 
capacity up to 20 bcm. It will run through Greece and Albania, 
under the Adriatic Sea to southern Italy. The construction of 
TAP would provide the countries involved in this project, such 
as Greece and Albania, with a large inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and foster economic growth. TAP, Nabucco 
West, and South Stream: The Pipeline Dilemma in the Caspian 
Sea Basin and Its Consequences for the Development of the 
Southern Gas Corridor (Kusznir, 2013:p.3). Nabucco West is 
the shortened form of the so-called “Classic Nabucco” put for-
ward a few years ago. “Classic Nabucco”, one branch of which 
started from Georgian-Turkish border and was more than 3 thou-
sand km in length, was planned for the transportation of 31 bil-
lion m3 of gas from Central Asia, South Caucuses and Middle 
East regions. The geopolitical situation in the above-mentioned 
regions, complete absence of export routes from these regions in 
the direction of Europe put the realization of that project under 
question (Nabucco West or TAP? 2013). Considering the gains 
accruing to Azerbaijan and Continental Europe from TAP and 
Nabucco-West, the model suggests that the Shah Denizfield’s 
consortium as well as the European consumers would favor TAP 
over Nabucco-West at 2013, as the final route from the Turkey–
EU border to the Central European markets. TAP ships the gas 
coming through TANAP from the Turkish-Greek border through 
Greece and Albania to Italy. TAP is based on a 2013 intergovern-
mental agreement between Albania, Italy and Greece (Offenberg, 
2016:p.14). The advantage of the TAP project is that it connects 
the Caspian Sea and Turkey on one side and the European mar-
ket on the other. Apart from its main route to Italy, which is the 
biggest European gas market after Germany, interconnectors can 
be built to Bulgaria from Greece, as well as a new pipeline to 
Montenegro and Croatia along the Adriatic coast from the tie-in 
in Albania, the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP).
Via the Caspian Sea (TCP). TCP carries Central Asian 
gas via an offshore pipeline under the Caspian Sea to its west-
ern coast, and from there the Southern Corridor (TANAP and 
TAP) delivers the gas to the Turkish and European markets. 
Turkmenistan benefits by 0.5bn € since TCP bypasses the cur-
rent transit countries, i.e., Russia and Iran, and introduces a new 
transport route for westbound Central Asian gas. The power of 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remains unchanged. They rely on 
Turkmenistan to access to TCP, and Turkmenistan’s spare pro-
duction capacity is more than enough to fill up the offshore pipe-
line’s capacity. Turkey enjoys supply competition in its market 
as well as it strains it position on the route (0.bn €). The suppliers 
serving the Turkish and European markets such as Russia, Iran 
and Norway suffer from supply competition with Turkmenistan. 
However, Azerbaijan benefits from Turkmenistan’s access to 
its export markets (0.5bn €) since it is the transit country on 
the route and controls Turkmenistan’s access to the Southern 
Corridor. Although the EC supports TCP, Turkmen gas via TCP 
returns the European players (i. e., the Balkans, Continental 
Europe and UK) only 0.3bn € due to the transit countries on 
the route, and the European companies show little interest in 
the project. This finding implies that the EC may have overesti-
mated TCP’s strategic impact on the European players. Costing 
0.5bn€ (Cobanli, 2014:pp.348-370). TCP is strategically via-
ble for the non- European countries Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan 
and Turkey (1.5bn € in total). Although Turkey has expressed 
its interest in Turkmen gas, the long-lasting dispute between 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over the Kyapaz field in the 
Caspian Sea. There have also been suggestions that a similar 
submarine pipeline could be used to transport natural gas from 
Kazakhstan to Baku, where it could be fed into BTE, which 
could then be linked to Nabucco. However, continuing oppo-
sition from Russia and Iran currently appears likely to prevent 
any submarine gas pipeline across the Caspian from moving 
beyond a hypothesis (Staadmuller, 2012:p.190).
Via Iran (TTP) Linking Turkmenistan via Iran to the 
Southern Corridor. TTP benefits Turkmenistan by 0.3bn €. 
Again, the transit countries, in this case Turkey and Iran, collect 
most of the gains from the project. While Turkey enjoys supply 
competition in its market, Iran benefits from better access to 
the markets. TTP affects the rest of the players in an analogous 
manner to TCP. Iranian president Seyyed Mohammad Khatami 
stressed their interest in the construction of the gas pipeline 
Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe (3,900 km long carrying 
capacity of about 15 bcm a year) and expressed their joint readi-
ness to promote performance of the international consortium. In 
the nearest time, Turkmenistan intends to initiate gas extraction 
in the world’s second gas field Galkynysh, whose reserves are 
evaluated from 13.1 to 21.2 tcm of natural gas. In view of start-
ing the development of such giant gas field, Ashkhabad is con-
cerned about seeking new exports routes (Zhiltsov, 2016).
Iran has the world’s biggest proven gas reserves, and 
Turkmenistan is ranked number four globally in terms of gas 
reserves. Together, the two neighboring countries, located in the 
richest swathe of land in the world in terms of energy resources, 
between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, have some 25% 
of the world’s gas. With the European Union and the United 
States lifting sanctions against Iran on 16thJanuary 2016, the 
EU will gain access to a second major gas market in the world, 
beside Russia, and combined with the soaring LNG imports 
envisaged in the next few years, the EU’s Energy Union’s stra-
tegic goal to diversify Europe’s energy supply could be reached.
After raising sanctions and normalizing the Tehran-US rela-
tionships and the extension of the new gas pipeline presently, 
supplying gas only to Iran as far as Turkey and further on to 
Europe could become soon reality.
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Via Russia: from South Stream to Turkish Stream. The 
south stream project is Russia’s response to Nabucco. It was 
first announced in june 2007 when the Italian energy company 
Eni Paolo Scaroni and Gazprom of Russia signed a memoran-
dum of understanding (MOU) which foresaw the construction 
of 900 km submarine pipeline from Druzhba on the Russian 
Black sea coast to the Bulgarian city of Varna. In Bulgaria, 
the pipeline will divide into two. The southern branch will 
run through Greece and under the Ionic sea to Italy, while the 
northwestern branch will run through Serbia and Hungary 
to the Baumgarten gas hub in Austria. The governments of 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Greece and Italy have all signed 
agreements with Russia foreseeing the construction of South 
stream. On December 1, 2014, following a meeting between 
the Russian and Turkish presidents, president Putin and 
Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller announced that South Stream 
had been cancelled. The South Stream cancellation was accom-
panied by a Russian announcement that it would be replaced 
with pipelines of the same capacity to deliver gas across the 
Black Sea directly to Turkey. Of the 63 bcm/year of capacity, 
14 bcm/year would replace the volume currently delivered to 
Turkey via Ukraine and the trans-Balkan pipeline, while the 
rest (approximately 50 bcm/year) would be delivered to the 
Turkish-Greek border where Gazprom would set up a natural 
gas “hub” for Southern European customers (Stern, 2015:p.5-
6)]. Turkish Stream proposals – both of which would create a 
new route in bringing (the same) Russian gas to Europe. For the 
EU, the energy security benefits of South Stream and Turkish 
Stream involving avoiding gas transit through Ukraine. Both 
routes diversify supply routes ... although not supply sources. 
Russians officials have stated that if the negotiations progress, 
gas could be delivered by the end of 2016. Turkish authorities, 
on the other hand, expect the project to continue for at least two 
and half years (De Micco, 2015).
6 Conclusion
As becomes apparent in the article, the Caspian littoral states 
.have many competing interests of a (geo-) political, economi-
cal and strategic nature. The five Caspian littoral states differ in 
terms of size, power projection capabilities and wealth in on- 
and offshore natural resources. The two main Caspian littoral 
powers are Russia and Iran, both endowed with huge natural 
gas and oil resources on shore, and both not very well endowed 
with natural gas resources offshore in the Caspian Sea. The 
three small Caspian littoral states lack power projection capa-
bilities, lack a diverse export market for natural resources (espe-
cially Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) and are can not afford to 
go against the two large Caspian states where it concerns their 
‘red-lines’. As such, the vision of importing large quantities of 
natural gas or oil from the eastern side of the Caspian (Central 
Asia) to the Western side of the Caspian (Europe), is a task and 
will require a tectonic shift in EU foreign policy or alliances vis 
a vis third countries. The EU’s energy security understanding 
revolved around primarily two objects: integration and diver-
sification. The former of these meant expanding the internal 
EU market structures, this way also including external actors. 
This focus on transparent market rules and networks would 
strengthen Brussels, as it would increase access and availabil-
ity of energy resources to the EU. Moreover, by interlinking 
energy infrastructure the Union would become more resilient 
to possible supply disruptions. In terms of the EU’s diversifica-
tion efforts, these were mainly related to attempts to establish 
new routes, seek to include new energy suppliers and finally to 
promote different energy types. All these three factors can be 
seen as having the same fundament in the EU energy thinking; 
as too large dependence on any one of these would constitute 
an energy security risk. Caspian basin and Central Asian coun-
tries played a role in both of the EU concerns. By integrating 
the Central Asian energy producing states into the EU network 
Brussels could formalize and institutionalize energy relations 
with the region. Consequently, this would turn Caspian coun-
tries into a stable supplier of energy to the EU, and the EU into 
a stable market for those countries. Moreover, the EU-Caspian 
energy structure could become a counterweight to Russia, 
hereby seeking to “calm” Russia down. Related to these points, 
Caspian countries were also an alternative for Brussels as a 
possible area of diversifying EU energy imports. 
As things stand now, the geographical limits dictate three 
possible or already realized options of shipping Eastern 
Caspian energy resources to the Western Caspian. The first 
one is a legacy of the Soviet Union: Central Asian and Caspian 
energy resources being shipped through Russian territory 
and pipelines, to Europe. This is already the status quo. The 
second option is to build trans-Caspian pipelines, pipelines 
for the transport of gas and oil, from the Eastern sea beds of 
the Caspian, to the Western sea beds of the Caspian, to s hip 
the onwards to Europe. Thirdly, the ‘southern route’, piping 
Eastern Caspian (Kazakh and Turkmen) natural gas and oil 
through over land pipelines, via Iran, to Turkey and onwards to 
Europe. All three options have pitfalls, drawbacks and rewards. 
In this conclusion, I will focus on the ‘path of least resistance’. 
As it mentioned above the EU policy push toward sup-
ply diversification is to lessen the dependence and power of 
a potential major (geo-)political competitor and peer, Russia. 
Chiefly because of that reason, the first option (piping more 
Caspian and Central Asian energy to Europe through Russia) 
is not plausible and not a viable option. The second option, 
building under sea pipelines, cutting through the Caspian Sea, 
from East to West, has great challenges of a different nature. 
The biggest problem with this option, and in my opinion in 
surmountable is the tandem opposition of Russia and Iran. Both 
countries vehemently oppose the building of pipelines from the 
Eastern Caspian to the Western Caspian. For Iran, it would 
deprive it of a very large potential future market, the EU, which 
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Iran could supply from it’s more than ample gas reserves. For 
Russia, it would not only deprive it of a ‘potential future mar-
ket’, it would undermine current gas delivery volumes, return 
on investment on already constructed pipelines. That makes 
both countries ready to do everything in their power to obstruct 
such a pipeline. 
The third and final option is the southern route, piping 
the energy overland, from the Eastern Caspian, through Iran, 
to Turkey and onwards to the EU. This is the path of least 
resistance.
There are already pipelines between Turkmenistan and Iran 
and between Iran and Turkey. Although those pipelines don’t 
have nearly enough capacity, parallel lines can be built. Routing 
through Iran solves two crucial problems. Firstly, it lessens 
dependence on Russian (routed) energy supplies. As such, it 
gives the captive Turkmen and Kazakh export markets a big 
breather. Their oil and gas can even be sold through the Persian 
Gulf ports. Secondly, it solves the insurmountable problem 
of double/tandem Russian-Iranian opposition to Caspian Sea 
pipelines. The EU has enough power to deal with Iran (mostly 
economically), but less with Russia. Iran has a population of 80 
million and cultural, historical links to t he other Caspian litto-
ral nations. Also, it give those small countries a viable alterna-
tive vis a vis Russia, in order to balance their foreign relations. 
As such, this EU policy, if executed well, could be a two birds 
with one stone: not only lessen dependence on Russian gas/
oil (transit), but also to lessen Russia’s influence in the littoral 
nations. That will force Russia to negotiate better prices in the 
future. As a side-bonus: Iran would be invested in behaving 
itself in the region and even in the middle east. Because being 
a reliable transit country for the first few years, would make 
EU policy heads open toward purchasing large quantities of 
Iranian gas, running along parallel lines, in the future. So it 
could potentially be three birds in one stone. 
What is evident is that EU dithering in making actual prog-
ress will weaken it’s hand and strengthen that of Russia, and 
increase alternatives for the Central Asian states. 
The complex set of competing geographical, (geo-) political 
and economical interests of the littoral Caspian states and the 
competing interests of the two main littoral Caspian powers, 
Russia and Iran, necessitate a comprehensive energy strategy 
and policy by the EU. Iran with huge energy resources and an 
unparalleled strategic position in Central Asia and the Persian 
Gulf, wants to be a major transit route in the energy scene, it 
needs to rethink its policy towards the West.
References
2013 demand for OECD countries from IEA Natural Gas. (2014). 2015–2030 
projections from Honoré. 8-9, 16-17.
An EU Strategy for relations with Iran after the nuclear deal (2016). [Online]. 
Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
IDAN/2016/578005/EXPO_IDA(2016)578005_EN.pdf [Accessed: 18th 
March 2015]
Aras, O. N., Süleymanov, E., Huseynov, R. (2013). The Importance of Azer-
baijan’s Energy Revenues in its Exports Volume and the Effects on the 
National Economy. International Journal of Business and Social Sci-
ence. 4(6), pp.79-81.
Atlantic Council. (2012). European Energy Security: Southern gas corridor on 
the move. [Online]. Available from: http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/
digital-library/articles/article.html/150937/pdf [Accessed: 16th March 
2016]
Bajrektarevic, A. H. (2003). The Caspian Basin: Legal, political and security 
concerns, pipeline diplomacy and implications for EU energy security. 
(AWP No. 149) [Online]. Available from: https://www.econstor.eu/
handle/10419/145385 [Accessed: 2th February 2016]
Ciarreta, A., Nasirov, S. (2012). Development trends in the Azerbaijan oil and 
gas sector: Achievements and challenges. Energy Policy. 40, pp. 282–
292. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.10.002
Cobanli, O. (2014). Central Asian gas in Eurasian power game. Energy Policy. 
68, pp. 348–370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.12.027
Crandall, M.S. (2006). Energy, Economics, and Politics in the Caspian Region: 
Dreams and Realities, Praeger Security International, Westport.
Croissant, M.P., Aras, B. (1999). Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Region. 
Praeger Publishers, Westport.
De Micco, P. (2015) Changing pipelines, shifting strategies: Gas in south-east-
ern Europe, and the implications for Ukraine. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/549053/
EXPO_IDA(2015)549053_EN.pdf [Accessed: 19th April 2015]
Dekmejian, R. H., Simonian, H. H. (2003). Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics 
of the Caspian Region. I.B. Tauris, New York.
Dekmejian, R. H., Simonian, H. H. (2003). Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics 
of the Caspian Region. I.B. Tauris, New York.
Directorate general for energy, key figures. (2015). [Online]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/countries/doc/key_figures.pdf 
[Accessed: 27th February 2013]
Europe’s energy position. Past and present. (2008). European Commis-
sion. [Online]. Available from: http://eu.europea/energy/publications/
doc/2008_moe_maquette.pdf [Accessed: 17th March 2014]
Gstol, S., Lannon, E. (2015). The neighbors of the European Union’s neighbors 
diplomatic and geopolitical dimensions beyond the European neighbor-
hood policy. The Caspian Sea region: struggle for resources.
Guy, Ch., Dombey, D. (2013). Total and Statoil pull out of TANAP gas pipe 
deal, Financial Times. [Online]. Available from: https://www.ft.com/con-
tent/2d2e749a-666d-11e3-8675-00144feabdc0 [Accessed: 20th April 2016]
Hassanzadeh, E. (2014). Iran’s natural gas industry in the post-Revolutionary 
period: Optimism, scepticism and potential. OIES/OUP, Oxford.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2010). Gas Trade Flows in Europe. [On-
line]. Available from: http://www.iea.org/gtf/index.asp [Accessed: 15th 
March 2014]
IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics. (2014). [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/energy/data/iea-natural-gas-informa-
tion-statistics_naturgas-data-en [Accessed: 13th February 2015]
140 Period. Polytech. Soc. Man. Sci. A. Ibrayeva et al.
Implementation of the Communication on se curity of energy supply and inter-
national cooperation and of the energy Council conclusions of November 
2011. (2013). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CEL-
EX%3A52013DC0638
Kandiyoti, R. (2008). What price access to the open seas? The geopolitics of 
oil and gas transmission from the Trans-Caspian republics. Central Asian 
Survey. 27(1), pp. 75–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930802221232
Kapitonov, I. A., Taspenova, G. A., Meshkov, V. R., Shulus, A. A. (2017). In-
tegration of Small and Middle-sized Enterprises into Large Energy Cor-
porations as a Factor of Business Sustainability. International Journal of 
Energy Economics and Policy. 7(2), pp. 44-52. URL: http://www.econ-
journals.com/index.php/ijeep/article/download/4040/2739
Kubicek, P. (2010). Energy Politics and the Geopolitical Competition in the 
Caspian Basin. Journal of Eurasian Studies. 4 (2), pp. 171-180.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2013.03.007
Kusznir, J. (2013). TAP, Nabucco West, and South Stream: The Pipeline Di-
lemma in the Caspian Sea Basin and Its Consequences for the Develop-
ment of the Southern Gas Corridor. Caucasus Analytical Digest. 47, pp. 
2-8. URL: http://www.laender-analysen.de/cad/pdf/CAD-47.pdf
Laumulin, M. (2007). The geopolitics of XXI century in Central Asia. Kazakh-
stan Institute for Strategic Studies at the President, Almaty.
Lazrelle, M., Mankoff, J. (2016). The European Union in a Reconnecting Eur-
asia: Foreign Economic and Security Interests. CSIS, Washington, DC.
Mangott, G. (2010). EU Gas supplies security: Russian and EU perspectives, 
the role of the Caspian the Middle East and the Magheb countries. Re-
search Report. 367, pp. 45-46.
Mombelli, A. (2013). TAP gas pipeline causes controversy. [Online]. Avail-
able from: http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/scepticism-flows_tap-gas-pipe-
line-causes-controversy/36350416 [Accessed: 5th March 2015]
Nabucco West or TAP? (2013). [Online]. Available from: http://www.socar-
plus.az/en/article/231/nabucco-West-or-tap [Accessed: 4th May 2016]
Offenberg, P. (2016). The EU neighbourhood and the EU’s security of supply 
with natural gas. Policy paper, 156, 14.
Pirani, S. (2012). Central Asian and Caspian Gas Production and the Con-
straints on Export. OIES, 69.
Pivariu, C. (2014). Geopolitics Nowadays: Significant Episodes 2011-2014. 
Pastel, Braşov.
Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: distinguishing natural gas 
security from geopolitics. (2014). OIES, 92, 24. 
Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: distinguishing natural gas 
security from geopolitics. (2014). OIES, 92, 12.
Scalability as Drawn. (2012). Azerbaijan 2012: The Business Year. Baku 
Shah Deniz major sales agreements with EU gas purchasers concluded. (2013). 
[Online]. Available from: http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/
press/press-releases/shah-deniz-major-sales-agreements-with-Europe-
an-gas-purchasers-c.html
Staadmuller, E., Bachmaan, K. (2012). The EU’s shifting borders approaches 
and policy of the new neighbourhood. Policy paper, 190.
Staadmuller, E., Bachmaan, K. (2012). The EU’s shifting borders approaches 
and policy of the new neighborhood. Working Paper, 191-192.
Statistical Review of World Energy (2009). [Online]. Available from: http://
www.bp.com/liveassets/bpinternet/globalbp/reports and publication/sts-
tisticalenergyreview2009 [Accessed: 10th February 2016]
TAP clinches Azeri gas pipeline deal. (2014) Financial times. [Online]. Avail-
able from: https://www.ft.com/content/41a3c048-de4f-11e2-b990-
00144feab7de [Accessed: 15th September 2016]
Turkmen gas: through Caspian sea to Europe. (2012). Turkish weekly. [Online]. 
Available from: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/141507/turkmen 
-gas-through-caspian-sea-to-Europe-html [Accessed: 23th February 2015]
Zimnitskaya, H., Von Geldern, J. (2010). Is the Caspian Sea a sea: and why 
does it matter? Journal of Eurasian studies. 2(1), pp. 1-14.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2010.10.009
Zhiltsov, S. S., Zonn, I. S., Kostianoy, A. G. (2016). Oil and Gas Pipelines in 
the Black-Caspian Seas Region. Springer International Publishing, Swit-
zerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43908-2
